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FLPMA'S LEGISLATIVE VETO PROVISIONS AND INS 
V. CHADHA: WHO CONTROLS THE FEDERAL LANDS? 
William P. Lee* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 1, 1983, the Secretary of the Interior, James Watt, 
made several large tracts of federal land available for long term 
coal leases. 1 On August 3, 1983, Morris Udall, Chairman of the 
House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, requested that 
Secretary Watt withdraw the tracts from consideration for leas-
ing.2 The authority allowing Chairman Udall to request and re-
quire such action of the Secretary is granted to the Interior 
Committee by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA).3 A legislative veto4 provision in FLPMA allows either 
the Senate Natural Resources Committee or the House Interior 
Committee5 to require the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw 
an area of federal land from consideration for leasing if that 
Committee believes that an emergency exists which threatens 
the land in question.6 Secretary Watt refused to comply with the 
Committee's request,1 claiming that the Supreme Court's decision 
* Staff Member, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review. 
I 48 Fed. Reg. 36,006-07 (1983). 
2 House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Committee Resolution of August 8, 
1988, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
3 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982). 
4 A 'legislative veto' is a statutory device employed by Congress which enables Con-
gress to reserve to itself the right of final approval over an agency's use of power 
delegated to it by Congress. See infra text and notes at notes 23-30. 
5 In the House of Representatives the Committee's full name is the House Committee 
on Interior and Insular Affairs. In the Senate it is the Senate Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee. 
6 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982). 
7 Letter from James Watt, Secretary of the Interior, to Congressman Morris Udall, 
Chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, (Sept. 9, 1983) 
(discussing Secretary Watt's refusal to comply with the Committee resolution). 
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in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha 13 had ren-
dered the provision granting the Committee that authority un-
constitutional. Secretary Watt proceeded to hold an auction in 
direct opposition to the House Committee's resolution, accepting 
bids for coal leases permitting exploration and mining in the 
wilderness areas.9 Chairman Udall challenged the Secretary's 
action in the District of Columbia Federal District Court in Na-
tional Wildlife Federation v. Watt.1O The court initially granted 
Udall an injunction preventing exploration of the lands in ques-
tion. 11 The court later held that Secretary Watt could not ignore 
the Committee vote because his own regulations required him to 
carry out the Committee's wishes.l~ The court thus avoided ruling 
on the main issue involved-whether the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Chadha struck down the legislative veto provisions in 
FLPMA -and instead decided the case on a technicality. 
This confrontation between the Congress and executive 
branch was a direct consequence of the Supreme Court's decision 
in Chadha. In that case the Court held that a legislative veto 
provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act (lNA)13 was 
unconstitutional. It The Court stated that because the provision in 
question allowed one House of Congress to take legislative action 
without the concurrence of the other House or of the President, 
such action was unconstitutional. 15 
Nearly 200 legislative veto provisions are presently contained in 
different federal statutes. 16 All of these provisions would probably 
be struck down as unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's 
analysis. 17 Included in these 200 legislative veto provisions are 
seven legislative vetoes in FLPMA. IH If the FLPMA legislative 
vetoes were to be held unconstitutional, the Act would collapse. 
H _ U.S. __ , 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). 
!J Lease Notice, 48 Fed.Reg. 36,006, 37,529 (1983). 
HI National Wildlife Federation v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145 (D. D.C. 1984). The Court held 
that the proposed leasing was illegal because it violated the Secretary's own regulations 
which require the Secretary to abide by Committee resolutions such as the one in 
question in this case. 
II Id. at 1147-48. 
I' Id. at 1156. 
I:: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982); 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) was the provision in question. 
H 103 S. Ct. at 2788. 
I:. Id. at 2787-88. 
In Id. at 2792 (White, J., dissenting). 
I' Id. 
lH 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(e)(2); 1713(c); 1714(c)(e),(f),(l)(2); 1722(b) (1982). For a description of 
each provision see infra, note 205. 
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The legislative vetoes in FLPMA are central to the goals of the 
Act,19 which are to retain the federal lands under public own-
ership and to re-assert Congress as the body with final power over 
the administration of the federal lands.20 Without the FLPMA 
legislative veto provisions most of the important land use deci-
sions would lie solely with the President, acting through the 
Secretary of the Interior, because Congress would no longer have 
the right to review the proposals of the Secretary regarding these 
decisions. 
This Article suggests that the Supreme Court use a different 
analysis than it used in Chadha if it evaluates the constitutional-
ity of the legislative veto provisions contained in FLPMA. The 
Court's analysis in Chadha has serious practical and constitu-
tional defects.21 The Chadha analysis does not take into account 
the nature of the legislative vetoes, the purpose served by the 
different vetoes, or even the constitutional power used to enact 
the individual legislative vetoes. A better standard to use when 
evaluating the constitutionality of legislative vetoes is the sep-
aration of powers standard that the lower courts have used and 
that Justices Powell and White encouraged the Court to employ.22 
Under a separation of powers evaluation the useful and harmful 
aspects of each different legislative veto would be considered. The 
FLPMA legislative vetoes would pass constitutional muster 
under a separation of powers doctrine evaluation. In this way 
Congress could retain its constitutional power over the federal 
lands and provide some check on the executive branch to ensure 
that the nation's resources are protected for future use and en-
joyment. 
This Article examines the Chadha opinion and the analysis 
used by the Court in that case. It is proposed that courts employ a 
different analysis if they consider the constitutionality of 
FLPMA's legislative vetoes. The Article first describes the legis-
lative veto and its development. The Article then discusses the 
Chadha opinion and why the analysis used in Chadha is not as 
19 H.R.REP. No. 1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE 
REPORT]. 
:lO Backiel & Baldwin, Who Controls the Federal Lands After Chadha?, in CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REVIEW THE LEGISLATIVE VETO AFTER INS v. Chadha 
18, 19 (Fall 1983). 
21 Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 1 (1984). 
22 103 S. Ct. at 2789 (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at 2792 (White, J., dissenting). 
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useful as the separation of powers analysis. The FLPMA is then 
reviewed, with particular emphasis on the statute's legislative 
veto provisions. The final section of the Article presents a separa-
tion of powers evaluation of the FLPMA legislative veto provi-
sions and concludes that the use of FLPMA's legislative vetoes is 
a constitutional exercise of Congress' property clause power. 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 
The history of the legislative veto is one of controversy. Every 
President confronted with legislative vetoes has opposed their use 
in at least some situations.23 At the same time, Congress increas-
ingly has relied on the legislative veto as a means of monitoring 
delegated powers.24 The Supreme Court decision in Chadha is the 
most recent chapter in the continuing controversy between Con-
gress and the Executive over the constitutionality of legislative 
veto provisions. This section discusses the history and develop-
ment of the legislative veto and describes the different veto 
mechanisms in use today. 
A legislative veto is a statutory device that gives Congress a 
right of final approval over executive agency25 or independent 
agency26 actions.27 Legislative vetoes are most often found in 
enabling statutes that delegate authority over a legislative area 
to an executive or independent agency.21l Congress delegates the 
power to the agency to make regulations or to take actions in 
order to carry out the purposes of a statute. Typically these 
regulations and actions represent the important but detailed 
work of the statutes that Congress is incapable of performing 
itself. A legislative veto provision in a statute allows Congress to 
review and possibly reject the regulations or actions taken by the 
:!3 Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 735, 737 n.7 (1979). 
24 Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive En-
croachment of Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323, 324 (1977). 
25 An executive agency is a department of the executive branch of government whose 
activities are subject to statutes and whose contracts are subject to judicial review. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 510 (5th ed. 1979). 
26 An independent agency is any agency outside the eleven executive departments. In 
an independent agency, unlike an executive agency, the President has no power to 
discharge the agency heads without cause. 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
ch. 2, § 7 (2d ed. 1978). 
27 Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional PfYWer, 
68 VA. L. REV. 253, 256 (1982). 
2" Abourezk, supra, note 24, at 324. 
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agency under the statute.:l9 Congress exercises legislative vetoes 
unilaterally, that is, without Presidential approval or consulta-
tion.:ll 
For example, Congress has the power to designate certain wat-
ers as marine sanctuaries. Congress has delegated the power to 
create marine sanctuaries and the terms relating to any such 
sanctuary to the Secretary of Commerce.31 At the same time, 
however, Congress withholds for itself the power to disapprove 
any designation of a marine sanctuary or any conditions that the 
Secretary imposes.32 Under this legislative veto provision Con-
gress will have sixty days after it is notified of a proposed 
sanctuary designation in which to pass a concurrent resolution 
disapproving the action of the Secretary.33 If Congress passes 
such a resolution, the sanctuary designation is terminated.34 If 
Congress does not pass such a resolution within the sixty days the 
designation becomes effective.35 
There are many different forms of legislative vetoes. A legisla-
tive veto provision may require action by both Houses of Con-
gress,36 one House,37 one committee,38 or even one committee 
chairman.39 Similarly, a legislative veto provision may require 
Congressional approval or disapproval to occur within thirty. 
days,40 ninety days,41 or two years42 of the executive branch or 
agency action under review. While the specific terms of legislative 
veto provisions differ, they all share one important characteristic: 
they allow Congress, acting alone, to have final review over the 
exercise of powers delegated to administrative agencies.43 
Ironically, the legislative veto first appeared in 1932 at the 
request of President Herbert Hoover, who sought authority from 
29 Martin, supra, note 27, at 256-57. 
30 Id. 
31 16 U.S.C. § 1432 (1982). 
32 Id. at § 1432(b)(2)(B). 
33 I d. at § 1432(h). 
34 Id. at § 1432(b)(2XB). 
3" Id. 
36 Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 
52 IND. L. J. 367, 372 (1977). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 373. 
39 Id. at 374. 
40 See Martin, supra note 27, at 256. 
41 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1713(c) (1982). 
42 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982). 
43 Martin, supra note 27, at 256-57. 
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Congress to reorganize the executive branch.44 In return for this 
grant of authority, Hoover agreed to allow Congress to review and 
reject his final reorganization plan.45 Congress accepted President 
Hoover's deal and passed the first of many Reorganization Acts 
containing legislative vetoes.46 
While the use of the legislative veto has expanded greatly since 
its inception, its use had increased most markedly during the past 
fifteen years.47 This increase is primarily the result of two factors. 
First, the abuses of power by the executive branch during the 
Watergate era prompted Congress to utilize new methods to 
police executive actions.18 Congress' enactment of legislative ve-
toes in the War Powers Act49 and the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act50 are two expressions of this Con-
gressional desire to limit the power of the Executive.51 Second, the 
recent proliferation of independent administrative agencies has 
led Congress increasingly to rely on the legislative veto as a 
method of monitoring agency decisions.52 The legislative veto re-
quires independent agencies which are otherwise politically unac-
countable, to answer to Congress for their actions.53 
Today a legislative veto provision is included as part of almost 
200 federal statutes,54 covering almost every field of national 
interest.55 Legislative vetoes have been enacted in such disparate 
fields as foreign policy,56 energy,',7 environmental regulation,5!l 
trade,5~ and economics.60 The Supreme Court's opinion in Chadha 
now threatens to invalidate all of these legislative veto provi-
sions.61 
44 103 S. Ct. at 2793 (White J., dissenting). 
45 Id. Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414 (1932). 
46 103 S. Ct. at 2793. 
47 Abourezk, supra note 24, at 324. 
46 Martin, supra note 27, at 259. 
49 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1982). 
:,0 31 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976). 
51 Martin, supra note 27, at 259 . 
. " Id. 
53 Henry, supra note 23, at 737. 
54 103 S. Ct. at 2792 (White, J., dissenting). 
55 I d. at 2792-93. 
56 War Powers Resolution § 5, 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (1982). 
57 Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 551, 42 U.S.C. § 6421(c) (1982). 
56 Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980 § 12, 16 U.S.C. § 1403(a) (1982). 
59 Trade Expansion Act of 1982 § 351, 19 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1982). 
60 Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 § 304(b), 31 U.S.C. § 1322 (Supp. 
III 1979). 
61 103 S. Ct. at 2792 (White, J., dissenting). 
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III. INS V. CHADHA AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 
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In Chadha, the Supreme Court ruled that a legislative veto 
provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act62 was un con-
stitutiona1.63 Since this was the Supreme Court's first review of a 
legislative veto,64 Chadha has become the centerpiece of the de-
bate over the constitutionality of the legislative veto. The Court's 
opinion may very well invalidate the use of all legislative vetoes.6.~ 
Two Justices argued that the Court's rationale was too sweeping 
and that the opinion should have been confined to a more narrow 
analysis.66 This section discusses the Chadha opinion and its likely 
effect on the future use of other legislative veto provisions. 
A. The Chadha Decision 
In Chadha, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of 
a legislative veto provision in the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (IN A). 67 This provision allowed either House of Congress to 
overturn the Attorney General's decision to allow a deportable 
alien to remain in the United States.6!l Under this legislative veto 
provision the House and Senate were given two sessions of Con-
gress in which to review all deportations suspended by the Attor-
ney Genera1.69 If either House passed a resolution disapproving 
any suspension during the two year period following a decision to 
suspend deportation, the suspension was revoked and the alien 
was required to be deported.70 
62 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982). 
63 103 S. Ct. at 2788. 
64 Note, Separation of Powers: The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 185 
(1983) . 
.. , 103 S. Ct. at 2792 (White, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. at 2789 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2792 (White, J., dissenting). 
67 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982). 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982) provides: "In the case of an 
alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this subsection [an alien whose 
deportation is suspended]-if during the session of Congress at which a case is reported, 
or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which the 
case is reported, either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution 
stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of said deportation, the 
Attorney General shall thereupon deport said alien .... " 
66 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982). The power to suspend deportations was exercised by the 
Attorney General through administrative judges in the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service in the Department of Justice. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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Pursuant to this legislative veto power, the House of Represen-
tatives in December, 1975, passed an undebated, voice vote reso-
lution overruling the Attorney General's decision to suspend the 
deportation of one Jagdish Rai Chadha.71 Chadha subsequently 
filed petition for review of the House's action with the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit claiming that the legislative veto 
provision in the IN A used to compel his deportation was un con-
stitutional.72 The Ninth Circuit held that the legislative veto pro-
vision of the IN A was an unconstitutional violation of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine.73 The court held that the provision per-
mitted Congress to interfere with the designated functions of the 
executive and judicial branches.74 
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision, but 
used a different constitutional theory to arrive at its conclusions.75 
The Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger,76 
analyzed the IN A legislative veto provision under article I of the 
United States Constitution.77 The Court held th~t the legislative 
veto was unconstitutional because it allowed Congress to legislate 
without following the procedures of article P' that require all 
legislation to be approved by both Houses and by the President.79 
The Court outlined three steps in its article I analysis. First, it 
held that all "legislative actions" by the Congress must adhere to 
the procedural requirements for legislating found in article LBO 
Second, the Court held that the House action taken pursuant to 
the INA legislative veto was a "legislative action."Bl Finally, the 
Court held that the only exceptions to the procedural require-
ments of article I were those explicitly provided for in the Con-
71 H.R.Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 121 CONGo REC. 40,800 (1975). 
7' 103 S. Ct. at 2772. 
73 Chadha V. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980). 
74 I d. at 421. 
75 103 S. Ct. at 2780-88. 
76 Chief Justice Burger's opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, O'Con-
nor, Marshall and Stevens. Justice Powell concurred in the result of the case. Justice 
White dissented and joined in the dissent by Justice Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist's 
dissent is not discussed in this Article because it dealt solely with the issue of the 
severability of unconstitutional provisions. 103 S. Ct. at 2816-17. 
77 103 S. Ct. at 2780-88. 
78 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; § 7, cls. 2, 3. 
79 Id. These clauses include the bicameralism requirement, which requires all bills to 
pass both Houses of Congress, and the presentment clause which requires that all bills 
be presented to the President and signed by him or passed over his veto by a 2/3 majority 
of each house. 
so 103 S. Ct. at 2780-84. 
HI Id. at 2784-86. 
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stitution.82 The House action in question was held unconstitu-
tional: it was a "legislative action" that did not meet the require-
ments of article I and it was not one of the exceptions allowed by 
the Constitution.83 
The Court began its analysis by examining the pertinent provi-
sions of article I of the Constitution. The article I bicameralism 
clause requires that all bills pass both Houses of Congress before 
being sent to the President.84 The presentment clauses of article I 
require that all bills must be presented to the President and 
signed by him, or passed over his veto, to become effective as 
law.85 According to the Court, the Framers created these pro-
cedural requirements to advance the goals of the separation of 
powers doctrine.86 The Court stated that the Framers designed 
the presentment clauses to prevent Congress from arrogating the 
powers vested in the Executive.87 The Framers' secondary pur-
pose in giving the President veto power was to ensure that Con-
gress did not have sole control over the type of legislation passed.88 
According to the Court the bicameralism requirement was de-
signed to prevent legislative tyranny by dividing the legislative 
power into two independent houses.89 The Chadha majority held 
that the article I procedures represent "a single, finely wrought 
and exhaustively considered, procedure"90 that must be followed 
in order to protect the important purposes of the Framers.91 
In the second part of its opinion the Court defined legislative 
actions as those actions which must comport with the article I 
procedures, and held that the House of Representatives action 
overturning Chadha's suspension of deportation was such a legis-
lative action.92 
The Court stated that whether an action was legislative de-
pends not on the form that the action takes, but on the effect of 
the action.93 The Court noted that any action by Congress contain-
82 1d. at 2786-87. 
83 1 d. at 2788. 
84 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; § 7, cl. 2. 
85 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; cIs. 2, 3. 
86 103 S. Ct. at 2787. 
87 1 d. at 2782. 
88 1d. 
89 1d. at 2783. 
90 1 d. at 2784. 
911d. 
92 1 d. at 2784-86. 
93 1 d. at 2784. 
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ing "matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its 
character and effect,"94 should be regarded as legislative action. 
The Court noted three characteristics of legislative action which 
were exhibited by the House action taken pursuant to the IN A 
legislative veto provision. 
First, the Court noted that the House action altered the legal 
rights and duties of people outside the legislative branch.95 Sec-
ond, the Court stated that "without the challenged provision 
[Chadha's deportation] could have been achieved, if at all, only by 
legislation requiring deportation."96 Third, the Court held that the 
'vetoing' of Chadha's deportation suspension was a policy deter-
mination by Congress and as such may only be effectuated 
through full legislation in accordance with article 1.97 From this 
the Court concluded that the House's action was an exercise of 
Congress' legislative power and therefore must follow the article I 
procedures.98 
In the third part of its opinion, the Court examined the excep-
tions to the article I requirements.99 The Court stated that there 
are only four instances in which one House of Congress may act 
with the force of law and not be subject to the procedural re-
quirements of bicameralism and presentment, all four of which 
are explicitly stated in the Constitution. 1OO The four exceptions are 
(1) the House of Representatives' power to initiate impeachments 
under article I; 101 (2) the Senate's power to conduct impeachment 
trials under article I; 1O:! (3) the Senate's power of approval of 
presidential appointments under article 11;103 and (4) the Senate's 
power to ratify treaties under article 11.104 
The House's action compelling Chadha's deportation was held 
to be an exercise of Congress' legislative power taken without 
adherence to the article I requirements of bicameralism and pre-
sentment.IO:; The Court held that because this action did not come 
94 Id. at 2784 quoting S.REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897). 
!J5 103 S. Ct. at 2784. 
96 I d. at 2785 . 
• 7 I d. at 2786. 
96 Id. at 2787 . 
.. Id. at 2786-87. 
100 I d. at 2786. 
101 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
103 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
104 Id. 
105 103 S. Ct. at 2787. 
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within one of the four constitutional exceptions, it was uncon-
stitutional. 106 
In his concurring opinion,107 Justice Powell argued that the 
legislative veto provision in the INA was an unconstitutional 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine.108 He asserted that 
Congress' action in this case constituted a usurpation of the 
power of the JUdiciary.109 According to Justice Powell, it is the 
province of the Judiciary to interpret the laws and see that legis-
lative standards are correctly applied in individual cases. 110 Jus-
tice Powell felt that Congress' veto of the Attorney General's 
decision to allow Chadha to remain in the United States 
amounted to a congressional determination that the executive 
branch had applied the statute's standards for suspension of 
deportation incorrectly. III Justice Powell objected that a con-
gressional determination that Chadha did not satisfy the INA 
criteria for suspension of deportation violated the separation of 
powers doctrine. According to Justice Powell when Congress de-
cides the rights of specific individuals, it is assuming a judicial 
function.11:l If Congress were allowed to do this it would enjoy 
unchecked power. ll3 Congress, Justice Powell stated, is not re-
quired to follow any procedural or substantive safeguards, such 
as the right to counsel and the right to an impartial tribunal, that 
protect individuals tried in court. 114 
While Justice Powell would have struck down the legislative 
veto in the IN A for violating the separation of powers doctrine, he 
would not have reached the question of whether legislative vetoes 
are unconstitutional per se. 115 
Justice White dissented from the majority opinion. lI6 Like the 
majority, Justice White examined the constitutionality of the INA 
legislative veto under article I of the Constitution. 1l7 Unlike the 
majority, however, he would have upheld the validity of the legis-
106 Id. at 2788. 
107 Id. at 2788-92 (Powell, J., concurring). 
108 I d. at 2789. 
100 Id. 
110 Id. at 2791. 
111Id. 
1" Id. at 2792. 
113 Id. 
114 I d. at 2791. 
115Id. 
116 Id. at 2792-816 (White, J., dissenting). 
117 Id. at 2798-808. 
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lative veto because he felt it did not violate the requirements of 
article LIII! 
Justice White asserted that the article I procedural require-
ments should not apply to Congress' use of its legislative veto 
power since such action, in his opinion, did not rise to the level of 
legislative action. 119 Rather, he argued, in exercising such powers, 
Congress is merely acting under a provision of an already ap-
proved statute to reject an executive proposal. I:lO Justice White 
contended that executive branch or independent agency recom-
mendations are not law; at most, he argued, they should be con-
sidered potentiallaw.1:l1 Thus, congressional action disapproving 
a recommendation did not constitute an exercise of legislative 
power, according to Justice White; it is more analogous to a con-
gressional decision not to pass a certain bill. 1:l2 
Justice White further argued that even if the INA legislative 
veto is considered a legislative act, the spirit of the article I 
procedures was met when Congress used the INA legislative 
veto. 1:l3 He claimed that under the IN A provision both Houses of 
Congress and the President have the opportunity to approve or 
reject the action being considered, as they do with normallegisla-
tive proposals.I:l4 According to Justice White the President ap-
proves the action in question when his delegates in the executive 
branch propose iU25 Similarly, both the Senate and the House 
approve the action by not rejecting it under their veto power, 
according to Justice White.1:l6 
Justice White also defended the use of the INA legislative veto 
on separation of powers grounds. I:l7 Like Justice Powell, Justice 
White would have rather had Chadha decided under a separation 
of powers analysis than under an article I analysis.I:lS Unlike 
Justice Powell, however, he would have upheld the constitutional-
ity of the INA legislative veto. l :l9 Justice White felt that this 
"" I d. at 2798. 
110 Id. at 2799. 
1'0 Id. 
1'1 Id. at 2807. 
I" I d. at 2806-07. 
I" Id. 
1'4 Id. 
I" Id. at 2806. 
I'" Id. 
mId. at 2808-10. 
I'" Id. at 2792. 
I'" Id. at 2798. 
~~-------------....... 
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legislative veto did not interfere with the legitimate functi()ns of 
either the executive or judicial branches. l:ll 
Justice White noted that the purpose of the separation of pow-
ers doctrine was to prevent one branch of government from ar-
rogating too much power. 131 Nevertheless, he asserted that "ac-
commodation and practicality" were the hallmarks of the Court's 
decisions regarding the doctrine. 132 Justice White argued that the 
Court should not strike down the legislative veto unless it's use 
usurped an expressly granted power of a coordinate branch. 133 
Legislative vetoes, he asserted, are useful tools allowing Congress 
to oversee the exercise of powers it has delegated to the sprawling 
executive bureaucracy and independent regulatory agencies. 134 
White claimed that the use of the legislative veto did not take 
any power away from the executive branch. 135 By delegating the 
power to the Attorney General to qualifiedly suspend deporta-
tions, Justice White felt that Congress was increasing, rather 
than decreasing, the power of the executive branch.136 He dis-
agreed with Justice Powell's assertions that the legislative veto 
infringed upon the authority of the judicial branch. 137 He noted 
that there was no constitutional duty to provide for judicial re-
view of decisions to deport aliens. las Congress did provide for 
judicial review of the Attorney General's decision if the alien was 
not granted a suspension,l39 but Congress reserved for itself the 
power to review a decision to grant a suspension. 140 Justice White 
felt that the 'practical' benefits of the legislative veto outweighed 
any separation of powers problems that might be caused by blur-
ring the distinctions between the three branches of govern-
ment.141 Justice White, therefore, would have upheld the use of the 
IN A legislative veto. 
130 ld. at 2809-10. 
131 ld. at 2808. 
132 ld. 
133 ld. at 2809. 
134 ld. at 2793. 
13. ld. at 2810. 
136 ld. 
137 ld. 
1311 ld. See also Fung Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 689, 713-14 (1983). 
139 103 S. Ct. at 2810 (White, J., dissenting). See also INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (per 
curiam). 
140 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982). 
141 103 S. Ct. at 2810 (White, J., dissenting). 
, 
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B. The Future of the Legislative Veto After Chadha 
Justices White and Powell both claimed that the Court's holding 
in Chadha "sound[ed] the death knell for nearly 200 other statu-
tory provisions in which Congress has reserved a legislative 
veto."142 If the Court's holding were to be applied broadly, all 
legislative veto provisions, by definition, would be struck down 
under the Court's reasoning. 143 That the Court intended the opin-
ion to be applied to all legislative vetoes is confirmed by compar-
ing the legislative veto provision in the INA to other legislative 
veto provisions struck down in the wake of Chadha. l44 
The week after Chadha was handed down the Supreme Court 
summarily affirmed two lower court opinions striking down legis-
lative vetoes that were different in form and substance from the 
INA legislative veto struck down by Chadha. 145 These legislative 
vetoes were contained in the National Gas Policy Act 146 and the 
Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act. 147 
In the first case, Consumer Energy Council of America v. Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission,14H the Supreme Court re-
viewed a legislative veto provision allowing either House of Con-
gress to veto pricing levels for natural gas proposed by the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The legislative veto 
was an integral part of the National Gas Policy Act because it 
allowed Congress to oversee the deregulation of the natural gas 
industry and the effect it would have on American gas consum-
ers.149 The Court summarily affirmed the D.C. Circuit decision 
striking down the legislative veto in question. 150 Similarly, in Con-
sumers Union of the United States v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion,151 the Supreme Court examined a legislative veto provision 
permitting Congress to veto a proposed Federal Trade Commis-
142 Id. at 2792. 
143 Id. 
144 Baldwin, The Effects of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha on 
Certain Provisions in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 5 (Sept. 14, 1983). 
145 See Note, supra note 64, at 191. 
146 15 U.S.C. § 3342(c) (1982). 
147 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(I) (1982). 
148 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd, 51 U.S.L.W. 3935 (U.S. June 28, 1983). 
149 51 U.S.L.W. 3935 (U.S. June 28, 1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
1;;0 51 U.S.L.W. 3935 (U.S. June 28, 1983). 
151 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd, 51 U.S.L.W. 3935 (U.S. June 28, 1983). 
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sion (FTC) regulation upon a resolution by both Houses. Again, 
the Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit's ruling striking 
down the legislative veto. 15~ 
The legislative vetoes struck down by the D.C. Circuit can be 
easily distinguished from the legislative veto struck down in 
Chadha. The legislative veto in the INA struck down by the Court 
in Chadha was a one House veto; the provision ruled unconstitu-
tional in Consumers Union v. FTC and affirmed by the Court was 
a two house legislative veto. I5.3 The IN A legislative veto allowed 
Congress to overturn a judicial decision concerning an individ-
ual's rights. In contrast, the legislative vetoes in the two subse-
quent cases allowed Congress to review regulations issued by 
independent agencies that have broad policy implications for the 
whole nation. 154 
The IN A legislative veto provision held unconstitutional in 
Chadha is a "somewhat atypical and more-readily indictable 
exemplar of the class" of all legislative veto provisions, according 
to Justice White. I5.; The INA legislative veto is atypical because it 
is especially intrusive on the executive and judicial branch func-
tions. l56 It allows one House of Congress to reverse the ruling of an 
immigration judge. 157 The subject matter of the IN A provision 
concerns an individual's right to remain in the United States 
while most other legislative veto provisions deal with policy 
choices that affect large segments of the population. l58 These 
latter choices are more legitimately the business of Congress to 
oversee. 
The Supreme Court's summary affirmation of the circuit court 
decisions striking down legislative vetoes that are markedly dif-
ferent from the legislative veto considered in Chadha demon-
strates that the Court intends the Chadha result to apply to all 
legislative vetoes. 159 
152 51 U.S.L.W. 3935 (u.s. June 28, 1983). 
153 Id. at 3936 (White, J., dissenting). 
154 I d. at 3935-36. 
155 103 S. Ct. at 2796 (White, J., dissenting). 
156 See Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980). 
157 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982). The actual decision to suspend deportation or to deport is 
made by INS judges. See supra note 68. 
15!l 103 S. Ct. at 2796 (White, J., dissenting). 
159 See Note, supra note 64, at 191. 
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C. The Article I Analysis versus the Separation of 
Powers Analysis 
The Court's opinion in Chadha casts serious doubt on the con-
tinued viability of all of the legislative veto provisions currently 
embodied in federal law. l60 The Court's article I analysis and 
language make the Court's opinion inflexible and indiscriminate. 
There are practical and constitutional problems with the Chadha 
opinion, though, that make it unlikely that Chadha will serve as a 
powerful precedent. 161 These problems should lead the Court to 
consider a different analysis with which to evaluate legislative 
veto provisions in the future. This analysis should be the separa-
tion of powers analysis under which Justices Powell and White 
would have decided the Chadha case. 162 
Justice White noted that the Chadha decision "strikes down in 
one fell swoop provisions in more laws enacted by Congress than 
the Court has cumulatively invalidated in its history."l63 Both he 
and Justice Powell argued that the Court has always decided the 
constitutionality of congressional statutes on the narrowest 
means available to overturn the statute. l64 "The Court has fre-
quently called attention to the 'great gravity and delicacy' of its 
function in passing upon the validity of an Act of Congress .... 
The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader 
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."I65 
The Court in Chadha, however, formulated the broadest rule 
possible with which to strike the INA provision down. This provi-
sion could most probably have been overturned on separation of 
powers grounds, but the Court's analysis goes much further and 
threatens many more provisions. 
There are also serious problems with the content of the Court's 
analysis. The Court held that the House's use of the INA legisla-
tive veto was an exercise of its legislative power because the use 
of the provision fit within the Court's definition of legislative 
action. l66 The Court defined legislative action as any action which 
(1) affects the legal rights of persons outside the legislative 
160 103 S. Ct. at 2796 (White, J., dissenting). 
161 See Tribe, supra note 21. 
162 103 S. Ct. at 2789 (Powell, J., concurring); 1d. at 2792 (White, J., dissenting). 
163 1d. at 2810-11 (White, J., dissenting). 
164 1d. at 2789 (Powell, J., concurring); 1d. at 2796 (White, J., dissenting). 
165 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring). 
166 103 S. Ct. at 2784-86. 
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branch,l67 (2) represents a policy determination, ISH and (3) any 
action whose result could otherwise only be accomplished through 
full legislation. 169 The Court held that whenever Congress takes 
legislative action it must follow fully the article I requirements of 
bicameralism and presentment, unless the action is one of the 
four constitutional exceptions to the article I procedures. 170 
The Court's definition of legislative action poses practical prob-
lems for later courts trying to interpret other congressional ac-
tions. The Court's definition is too broad; it encompasses almost 
every action Congress might take. 171 Even the subpoenaing of a 
witness by a committee or the request by Congress that an 
agency initiate an investigation, would be included under the 
Court's definition of legislative action. In These actions would then 
be subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements, to 
which they have never been subject in the past. l73 This is an 
impractical and unintended result of strict application of the 
Clwdha rationale. 
There also appears to be a constitutional problem with the 
Court's holding. 174 The Court's definition of legislative action, be-
sides encompassing most congressional actions, would include 
most executive department and independent agency actions. 175 
Both the majority and the dissent in Clwdha agreed that agencies 
exercise the functional equivalent of lawmaking power when they 
promulgate rules under a congressional statute.176 Justice White 
noted that even private groups and individuals are able to take 
legislative action, as defined by Chadlw, whenever acting pur-
suant to a congressional delegation of power. 177 These agencies 
and groups all exercise legislative action but none are required to 
161 I d. at 2784. 
168 Id. at 2786. 
169 Id. at 2785. 
110 Id. at 2786. 
111 See Note, supra note 64, at 192. 
112 "First a committee that subpoenas a witness has made the 'policy decision' that his 
testimony is required. Second, if the witness fails to appear, he is subject to contempt-
of-Congress proceedings, at that point his legal duties have been altered. Finally, with-
out the subpoena process Congress presumably would have to pass bills in order to 
require persons to testify before its committees." Id. at 192 n.45. 
113 See Note, supra note 64, at 192. 
114 See Tribe, supra note 21. 
115 Id. at 9-10. 103 S. Ct. 2801-04 (White, J., dissenting). 
116 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n. 16; Id. at 2802 (White, J., dissenting). 
111 I d. at 2801. 
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fulfill the procedures for legislating found in article I. 178 Congress, 
in other words, may delegate legislative authority to an individual 
or to an agency, but may not retain for itself-the constitutional 
law-making body-the power to oversee how the delegated au-
thority is used. 179 
Justice White noted that "[p]erhaps this odd result could be 
justified on other constitutional grounds ... but certainly it can-
not be defended as consistent with the Court's view of the article I 
presentment and bicameralism commands." 180 The Court states in 
Chadha that the basis of the article I procedures was the separa-
tion of powers doctrine. 181 The purpose of this doctrine is to ensure 
that none of the three branches of the federal government acts 
outside of its sphere and that each branch's powers are exercised 
only by that branch. 18z Under the Court's ruling in Chadha it 
would appear that the executive branch agencies and other 
groups may exercise legislative power, but that the legislature 
cannot delegate legislative power to itself.l83 This is in direct 
contravention of the purposes for which the article I procedural 
requirements were created. l84 It seems inconsistent, at the least, 
for the Court to require Congress to fulfill procedural require-
ments and at the same time undermine the purposes of those 
same requirements. 
The practical and constitutional deficiencies in the Chadha 
holding may very well cut back upon Chadha's precedential 
value. l85 Chadha could become the third in a series of 'one-shot' 
cases in which the Supreme Court has limited Congress' authority 
on separation of powers or federalism grounds. l86 The first and 
second cases in this set are Buckley v. Valeo lH7 and National 
League of Cities v. Usery.l88 Neither of these two cases has had 
any noticeable generative effect or cut any lasting trails for con-
stitutional law. IS!! In fact, National League of Cities was recently 
'7. I d. at 2802. 
'7. ld. See also Tribe, supra note 21, at 10. 
11<0 103 S. Ct. at 2803 (White, J., dissenting). 
'"I ld. at 2781. 
[M' 634 F.2d at 425. 
'M3 103 S. Ct. at 2804 (White, J., dissenting). 
'"4 ld. at 2803 n.20. 
[&, Tribe, supra note 21, at 1-3. 
[l<6ld. 
'"7 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
, .. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
["" Tribe, supra note 21, at 2. 
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overturned by the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Met-
ropolitan Transit Authority. 190 In overruling National League of 
Cities, the Court commented that the principle set out in that case 
is "not only unworkable but is inconsistent with established prin-
ciples of federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism prin-
ciples in which National League of Cities purported to rest."191 A 
similar fate may await Chadha in the near future. 
If Chadha, because of its problems, goes the way of Buckley and 
National League of Cities, the courts will have to turn to another 
standard by which legislative veto provisions can be evaluated. 
This standard should be the separation of powers doctrine analy-
sis which was suggested by Justices Powell and White. 
D. The Separation of Powers Doctrine 
The separation of powers doctrine is the underlying basis of the 
Constitution.192 The doctrine serves two purposes: first, it pre-
vents a dangerous accumulation of power in anyone branch of 
government,193 and second, it divides the governing functions be-
tween the branches to provide for effective government. l94 The 
doctrine stands for the sometimes conflicting ideas that power 
must be separated to prevent tyranny, but that interaction be-
tween the different branches is necessary to govern. 195 
The separation of powers analysis of a legislative veto provision 
is more precise than the article I analysis. A separation of powers 
analysis, such as that used by the Ninth Circuit in Chadha, con-
siders each legislative veto on its own merits and its own faults. 196 
Rather than sweeping away all legislative vetoes, such a separa-
tion of powers analysis would look to how intrusive each legisla-
tive veto is on the functions of the executive or judicial branch, 
and also look to the purposes served by each veto. 197 
According to the majority, the separation of powers doctrine, as 
the basis of the article I procedures, was the foundation of the 
Chadha opinion. l !J8 Unfortunately, the rationale used in Chadha 
100 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985). 
191 [d. at 4136. 
192 103 S. Ct. at 2781. 
193 634 F.2d at 422. 
194 [d. at 423. 
195 [d. at 422-25. 
196 634 F.2d 408. 
197 [d. at 425. 
19" 103 S. Ct. at 2781. 
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would overturn all legislative veto provisions, regardless of 
whether they violate the separation of powers doctrine. l99 If the 
separation of powers doctrine is used to evaluate legislative vet-
oes the purposes of article I will be safeguarded while the goals of 
the separation of powers doctrine will not be disregarded. 
If the Supreme Court had used a separation of powers analysis 
in Chadha the INA legislative veto still could have been held 
unconstitutional, as both the Ninth Circuit:l)() and Justice Powe1l201 
demonstrated. The Ninth Circuit held that the IN A legislative 
veto violated the separation of powers doctrine by allowing Con-
gress to interfere with the functions of the judicial and executive 
branches.202 Justice Powell believed that the INA provision was 
unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers doc-
trine by permitting Congress to usurp the function of the 
judiciary to decide whether the executive branch has applied the 
statutory standards correctly in individual cases.203 A separation 
of powers analysis could have set a precedent that would distin-
guish between abusive legislative vetoes and less intrusive legis-
lative vetoes that serve a more valid constitutional purpose. In-
stead the article I analysis and the language used by the Court to 
define 'legislative action' make the opinion inflexible, indiscrimi-
nate, and contradictory. The Chadha opinion takes no cognizance 
of the purposes served by different legislative vetoes or the histor-
ical reasons for their use. As the opinion stands now, it will strike 
down all legislative veto provisions including the important legis-
lative vetoes in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act.204 
IV. THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY MANAGEMENT ACT 
There are seven legislative veto provisions in FLPMA.205 These 
provisions are central to the accomplishment of the goals of 
''''' Id. at 2788 (Powell, J., concurring). 
:lOll Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980). 
20' 103 S. Ct. at 2788-92 (Powell, J., concurring). 
:lO2 Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980). 
:lOa 103 S. Ct. at 2788-92 (Powell, J., concurring). 
:!04 See Baldwin, supra note 144,29-30. 
:!o.' The seven legislative veto provisions are: 
1} 43 'u.S.C. § 1712(e}(2} (1982), giving Congress final disapproval by concurrent 
resolution of decisions excluding a major land use from a tract of land 100,000 
acres or more for two or more years. 
2} 43 U.S.C § 1713(c} (1982) giving Congress the right to disapprove sales of 
tracts of federal land greater than 2,500 acres by passing a concurrent resolu-
tion of disapproval. 
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FLPMA and therefore central to the issue of federal land use in 
America.:lOS FLPMA dictates how the publicly owned lands in the 
United States-more than 450 million acres-will be adminis-
tered and whether the lands will be sold off or leased to private 
industry.:107The passage ofFLPMA in 1976 marked the beginning 
of a new era in federal land policy.:108 It changed the way in which 
the federal government administered the public lands, as well as 
the goals toward which these lands were administered.:109 The new 
goal of federal land management became the retention of the 
federal lands in public ownership.:!l0 The means to this end were 
the legislative veto provisions which allowed Congress the right to 
review all of the major executive branch decisions regarding the 
disposition of the federal lands.:!11 
This section discusses federal land management prior to 
FLPMA and the ways that FLPMA changed national land use 
policy. This section will also evaluate the constitutionality of the 
legislative veto provisions in FLPMA in light of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Chadha. 
A. The Changes Wraught in Federal Land Management by 
FLPMA 
Prior to the enactment of FLPMA, federal land administration 
was in disarray.:!!:! Despite the enormity of the duty of administer-
ing 1,800 million acres of public lands,2!3 Congress did not enact a 
comprehensive land policy until 1976 when FLPMA was passed. 
3) 43 U.S.C § 1714(c) (1982) allowing Congress to disapprove by concurrent 
resolution withdrawals of 5,000 or more acres. 
4) 43 U.S.C § 1714(e) requires the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw lands 
when notified by the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee or the 
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee that an emergency requires 
a withdrawal. 
5) 43 U.S.C. § 1714(f) (1982) gives Congress the power to disapprove by concur-
rent resolution extensions of withdrawals. 
6) 43 U.S.C. § 1714(IX2) (1982) giving Congress the power to disapprove by 
concurrent resolution the termination by the Secretary of certain withdrawals. 
7) 43 U.S.C. § 1722(b) (1982) allowing Congress to suspend disposal of certain 
areas. 
206 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 204. 
207 [d. at 2. 
201! [d. at 34-5. 
209 Backiel, supra note 20, at 19. 
210 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1982). 
211 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 3. 
212 [d. at 34. 
213 [d. at 2. 
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In the early part of this century the federal lands were adminis-
tered through the General Land Office of the Department of the 
Interior.~14 In 1934 Congress created the Grazing Service to assist 
the General Land Office with the managing of the government's 
extensive landholdings in the West.~15 In 1946 these two agencies 
were combined and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) was 
created.~16 
During this time there was no comprehensively delegated au-
thority over the public lands, and no coherent land use policy.~17 
The federal land agencies derived their mission from over 3,000 
land use statutes that had been enacted over the span of 170 
years.~lS Far from providing a coherent authorization for federal 
land management, these statutes were "seriously inadequate, 
incomplete, and sometimes confiicting."~19 The executive branch 
took it upon itself to fill in many of the gaps left by these stat-
utes.~:lO In United States v. Midwest Oil the Supreme Court held 
that congressional silence in the face of the executive branch 
actions was an implied grant of power to the executive branch. ~~1 
Over the years the executive branch assumed a great deal of 
power over the federal lands in this way.~~z 
The primary goal of public land administration under statutes 
prior to FLPMA was to distribute the federal lands to private 
parties or to the states.~~3 The federal government gave away the 
lands in order to encourage settlement of the West and to foster 
productive use of the lands. ~24 Over seventy percent of the public 
domain in the contiguous forty-eight states was transferred to 
non-federal ownership during the period of disposal-oriented 
management prior to FLPMA.225 
The enactment of FLPMA, however, brought about distinct 
214 I d. at 34. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 I d. at 34-35. 
21" I d. at 34. 
219 Id. 
220 Backiel, supra note 20, at 19. 
221 U.S. v. Midwest Oil Company, 236 U.S. 459 (1915). The Court held that the executive 
branch's practice of withdrawing public lands from private mining after Congress had 
opened the lands to mining was so long standing and accepted by Congress that the 
executive branch was presumed to be acting with Congress' consent. 
222 Backiel, supra note 20, at 19. 
223 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 33-34. 
224 Id. 
225 Backiel, supra note 20, at 19. 
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policy changes in several areas of federal land management. 
FLPMA has three main goals: (1) to change the mission of the 
BLM from the disposal to retention of the public lands;226 (2) to 
give the BLM a comprehensive authorization, including specific 
guidelines and standards;227 and (3) to re-establish Congress' con-
stitutional authority over the federallands.228 
Congress' goal of retaining the federal lands in public own-
ership reflected the national desire to preserve the beauty of the 
federal lands for the future rather than have them sold off and 
exploited by private interests.2:!9 In contrast to the government's 
former policy of giving away federal lands, FLPMA expressly 
provides for retention of the public lands and preservation of all 
"scenic, historical, ecological [and] environmental" values.2:ll 
FLPMA delegates to the BLM the statutory authority to carry 
out its mission of administering the lands in public ownership.231 
Among the powers Congress gave the BLM were the powers to 
buy and lease federal lands. 232 BLM also was granted the author-
ity to issue rules and regulations concerning the federal lands and 
the power to enforce those rules.233 FLPMA repealed or amended 
many of the old land use laws in order to create a uniform and 
coherent statement of national policy.234 By so doing, the Act 
clearly delineates the powers of the Secretary of the Interior and 
the BLM and provides comprehensive goals for the administra-
tion of federal lands. 
FLPMA also marked the end of the executive branch's assump-
:!:!6 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1982) states that it is the policy of the United States that "the 
public lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless as a result of the land use planning 
procedure provided for in this Act, it is determined that disposal of a particular parcel 
will serve the national interest .... " 
227 43 U .S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (1982) provides that "goals and objectives be established by law 
as guidelines for public land use planning." 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(10) states that "uniform 
procedures for any disposal of public land, acquisition of non-Federal land for public 
purposes, and the exchange of such lands be established by statute .... " See also HOUSE 
REPORT, supra note 19, at 2-3. 
22" 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(4) (1982) states that "Congress exercise its Constitutional author-
ity to withdraw or otherwise designate or dedicate Federal lands for specific purposes 
and that Congress delineate the extent to which the Executive may withdraw lands 
without legislative action .... " See also Backiel, supra note 20, at 19. 
2:!!l HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 34. 
:!30 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1982). 
231 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 34. 
232 See 43 U .S.C. § 1732 (1982). 
233 See id. §§ 1733, 1740. 
:!34 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 2. 
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tion of congressional power over the federal lands.235 Although 
FLPMA delegated a great deal of authority to the BLM, it also 
provided for congressional review of BLM actions taken pursuant 
to that delegated power.236 In FLPMA Congress explicitly reas-
serted its constitutional authority under the property clause to 
make federal land use decisions.237 FLPMA allowed Congress to 
exercise this authority primarily through the use of its legislative 
vetoes, which permit Congress to review and overturn certain 
BLM actions such as sales or withdrawals of federallands.238 
B. F LP MA Legislative Vetoes After Chadha 
All of the legislative veto provisions in FLPMA allow Congress 
to exercise final control over important federal land management 
decisions.:l39 This subsection evaluates the constitutional viability 
of FLPMA's legislative vetoes in light of the Chadha opinion. 
Section 204(c)240 of the Act typifies the legislative veto provisions 
in FLPMA. This section allows Congress to overturn any decision 
by the BLM to withdraw a tract of federal land of more than 5,000 
acres.241 When the Secretary withdraws the land he must notify 
Congress of his decision.242 If Congress passes a concurrent resolu-
tion of disapproval within ninety days of receiving notice of the 
action, the withdrawal must be terminated.243 
Using this provision, Congress is able to exercise its power, 
bestowed by the Constitution, to regulate the disposition of the 
public lands.244 Like the other legislative veto provisions in 
FLPMA, this section permits Congress, without the approval of 
the President, to veto decisions of the Secretary of the Interior. In 
235 Backiel, supra note 20, at 19. 
:l36 [d. 
237 [d. 
:l38 All seven of the legislative veto provisions in FLPMA give Congress final review 
over major sales or withdrawals by the BLM. See supra note 205. 
:l3!l [d. See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 3-4. 
240 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c) (1982). 
241 [d. "Withdrawal" is defined by FLPMA as "withholding an area of Federal land 
from settlement, sale, location, or entry, under some or all of the general land laws, for 
the purpose of limiting activities under those laws in order to maintain other public 
values in the area or reserving the area for a particular public purpose or program .... " 
[d. at § 1702(j). 
242 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c) (1982). 
243 [d. 
244 U.S. CaNST. art. IV, § 3, c1.2. 
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this respect, the FLPMA legislative vetoes appear constitution-
ally flawed under Chadha.245 
Chadha held that Congress must adhere to the article I pro-
cedural requirements of bicameralism and presentment when 
taking legislative action. Although most of the legislative vetoes 
in FLPMA require bicameral action,246 none of them provide for 
presentation to the President in order to reject a BLM decision. 
By permitting Congress to take legislative action without fulfil-
ling the procedural requirements of article I, the legislative ve-
toes in FLPMA appear to be unconstitutional under the rationale 
of Chadha.247 
A congressional veto of a decision made by the Secretary consti-
tutes legislative action under Chadha's definition of that term. 
First, Congress' action affects the rights and duties of people 
outside the legislative branch, including the Secretary and any 
person for whose use the lands in question were being with-
drawn.24/l Second, according to Chadha, since a decision by the 
Secretary could not be overruled without full legislation in the 
absence of a legislative veto, the action is legislative in nature.249 
Third, Congress' determination that certain lands should not be 
withdrawn is a policy determination, and, according to Chadha, 
can only be done pursuant to Congress' legislative powers.25O 
Thus, the termination of the withdrawal would be considered an 
exercise of Congress' legislative power, and can only be exercised 
if the procedural requirements of article I are fulfilled. 251 
The legislative veto provisions in FLPMA appear to suffer the 
same constitutional defects as the INA legislative veto struck 
down in Chadha. As was asserted above, the Chadha opinion is 
constitutionally and practically flawed. 252 The overbreadth and 
indiscriminate sweep of the Chadha Court's article I analysis 
would be especially severe in its application to the FLPMA legis-
lative veto provisions. FLPMA's legislative vetoes should be eval-
uated in terms of the separation of powers doctrine because of the 
245 See supra text at notes 78-83. 
246 See supra note 205. 
247 See Baldwin, supra note 144, at 14. 
~ 
2411 Letter from James Watt, Secretary of Interior, to Congressman Morris Udall, 
Chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, (Sept. 9, 1983) 
(discussing Secretary Watt's refusal to comply with the Committee resolution). 
249 [d. 
250 [d. 
251 [d. 
2.,2 See supra text and notes at notes 161-84. 
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more practical, flexible nature of that doctrine as opposed to the 
Court's article I evaluation. 
A separation of powers evaluation of FLPMA's legislative ve-
toes would take into account the nature of Congress' authority 
pursuant to the property clause, which is the power under which 
Congress passed FLPMA.253 The separation of powers doctrine 
would also take cognizance of the intent of Congress in passing 
FLPMA, and the interference, if any, with the other branches 
created by the use of FLPMA's legislative veto provisions.254 
V. A SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE EVALUATION OF 
FLPMA's LEGISLATIVE VETOES 
The separation of powers doctrine has two main purposes: to 
prevent a dangerous concentration of power in anyone branch of 
government/55 and as a "practical measure to facilitate adminis-
tration of a large nation."256 The separation of powers doctrine is a 
pragmatic, flexible doctrine that places great worth in political 
comity and the necessities of governing.257 
There are no strict lines defining the point where one branch's 
authority leaves off and another branch's authority begins.251l In 
the past, the Supreme Court has only found a violation of this 
doctrine in instances where one branch has usurped a power that 
was granted by the Constitution with great specificity to another 
branch. 259 
The Ninth Circuit, in holding that the INA legislative vetoes 
violated the separation of powers doctrine, defined a violation of 
the doctrine as "an assumption by one branch of powers that are 
central or essential to the operation of a coordinate branch, pro-
vided also that the assumption disrupts the coordinate branch in 
the performance of its duties and is unnecessary to implement a 
legitimate policy."260 Justices Powell and White applied a similar 
2:;3 See Baldwin, supra note 144, at 14. 
2M See Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 (D.C. Mont. 1981), clarified, 
539 F. Supp. 1194 (D.C. Mont. 1982) in which the court held that § 204(e) of FLPMA did 
not violate the separation of powers doctrine. 
:!55 Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 422 (9th Cir. 1980). 
256 Id. at 423. 
257 I d. at 421-22. 
256 I d. at 423-24. 
2:;9 103 S. Ct. at 2809 (White, J., dissenting); 634 F.2d at 420. 
200 634 F.2d at 425. 
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standard when the Supreme Court reviewed the IN A legislative 
veto provision. ~61 
Congress' use of the legislative veto provisions in FLPMA is not 
a violation of the separation of powers doctrine as defined by the 
Supreme Court. The Constitution grants Congress the power to 
regulate and dispose of the federal lands under the property 
clause of article IV.~6~ This power is granted specifically and ex-
pressly to the legislature in the property clause. Therefore, when 
Congress exercises its property clause power through FLPMA's 
legislative vetoes it is not usurping a power specifically given to 
another branch by the Constitution. 
Additionally, Congress' exercise of its constitutional power 
through the legislative veto provisions in FLPMA is not a viola-
tion of the standard used by the Ninth Circuit. Congressional use 
of these provisions does not entail usurpation of, nor an intrusion 
into, the central functions of the other two branches of govern-
ment. Unlike the INA legislative veto struck down in Chadha, the 
FLPMA legislative veto provisions do not allow Congress to re-
view or overturn judicial determinations.~()3 Moreover, the 
FLPMA legislative vetoes do not permit Congress to decide the 
rights of specific individuals or review executive actions to ensure 
that they are taken in accordance with statutory criteria.~64 Con-
gressional exercise of FLPMA's legislative veto provisions is thus 
not a violation of the judicial branch's constitutional sphere. 
Congressional use of the FLPMA legislative vetoes is not an 
"assumption of power essential to the operation" of the executive 
branch. The Secretary of the Interior, through the BLM, is not 
prevented from carrying out the administration of the public 
lands. The legislative veto provisions merely permit Congress to 
retain the power to make policy decisions reflecting the national 
interest. 
Congress is granted the power over the federal lands by the 
Constitution.~6.) Congress' authority pursuant to the property 
'61 103 S. Ct. at 2790 (Powell, J., concurring); ld. at 2809 (White, J., dissenting). 
,6, U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2 grants Congress the power to "dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to 
the United States .... " 
'6.3 See supra note 205. The FLPMA legislative veto provisions merely allow Congress 
to review BLM land management proposals. There are no adjudicatory proceedings 
involved in these proposals as there were in the immigration judge's suspension of 
deportation under the INA. See supra note 68. 
'64 See supra note 205. 
'6; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
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clause is that of both a private landowner and a government.266 
Congress can thus delegate authority over the federal lands in 
whatever manner that it chooses/67 and Congress can also regu-
late the use of the federal lands in ways that private landowners 
cannot.26S Congress' constitutional power over the federal lands 
has been held to be "without limitations."269 
The framers of the Constitution intended that the power over 
the federal lands reside with Congress.270 Congress, it would seem, 
is not usurping the executive branch's power when it uses a 
legislative veto provision to oversee executive agency use of dele-
gated power over the federal lands. 
The Ninth Circuit in Chadha 271 argued that Congress interfered 
with the executive branch~s constitutional function of executing 
the laws when it used the IN A legislative veto provision.21'2 Justice 
White answered this assertion by stating that the executive 
branch is constitutionally permitted to execute only the laws that 
Congress passes.:m FLPMA delegates power to the BLM to man-
age the federal lands but reserves to Congress the final review 
over important federal land management decisions.274 Rather 
than usurping executive branch power, FLPMA augments it by 
delegating to the executive branch authority over the federal 
lands that it would not otherwise have. 
A federal district court has held that one of FLPMA's controv-
ersial legislative vetoes-the same provision that was at issue in 
National Wildlife Federation v. Watt 275-did not violate the sep-
aration of powers doctrine. In Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt,276 
a Montana Federal District Court held that section 402(e)277 of the 
266 U.S. v. Midwest Oil Company, 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915). 
267 [d. 
266 See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976). 
269 [d. at 539, quoting U.S. v. San Fransisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940). 
270 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See also 103 S. Ct. at 2800 n. 118 (White, J., 
dissenting). Justice White argues in his dissent that the framers envisioned a type of 
legislative veto power for Congress to exercise under its constitutional property clause 
power. For a complete discussion of the argument that Congress' property clause power 
need never be exercised pursuant to the article I procedural requirements, see Baldwin, 
supra note 144. 
271 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980). 
272 [d. at 431-32. 
273 103 S. Ct. at 2809-10 (White, J., dissenting). 
274 See supra note 205. 
275 571 F. Supp. 1145 (D. D.C. 1984). 
276 529 F. Supp. 982 (D.C. Mont. 1981), clarified, 539 F. Supp. 1194 (D.C. Mont. 1982). 
277 43 U.S.C § 1714(e) (1982). 
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Act did not allow Congress to impermissibly interfere with the 
functioning of the executive branch.27!l This section of the Act 
allows the Interior Committee of either House of Congress to 
notify the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw an area from 
certain uses if the Committee feels that an emergency exists 
which threatens the land.279 The court ruled that this section, as 
interpreted, was constitutionaUHo 
Violations of the separation of powers doctrine, as defined by 
the Ninth Circuit, do not include actions that are "implementing a 
legitimate policy."2Hl Some actions are therefore not considered 
violations of the separation of powers doctrine because they fur-
ther the second purpose of the doctrine: facilitating the practical 
administration of the nation. 282 
The FLPMA legislative veto provisions are practical measures 
designed to facilitate the federal government's job of regulating 
and protecting the nation's public lands. The purpose of the veto 
provisions is to give Congress the final say over major federal 
land use decisions.2H3 All seven FLPMA legislative vetoes permit 
Congress to review the sale or withdrawal of large tracts of public 
lands.2H4 Congressional approval or disapproval of proposed BLM 
actions under the legislative veto provisions therefore represent 
Congress' determination of national policy regarding federal 
lands. This manner of congressional decision making is constitu-
tional under the separation of powers doctrine: Congress has 
delegated to the executive branch the day-to-day administrative 
details of regulating federal lands, while retaining for itself the 
freedom to formulate national policy. 
It is not practical for Congress to legislate beforehand on 
whether or not certain lands shoUld be sold or retained or with-
drawn from specific uses. These are decisions that can only be 
made on a case by case basis. The most efficient way to administer 
the federal lands in Congress' view is to delegate to the Secretary 
of the Interior and the BLM the power to administer the details of 
federal land management while allowing Congress to retain final 
authority over the most important land use decisions. 
278 529 F. Supp. 982 (D.C. Mont. 1981). 
279 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982). 
280 529 F. Supp. at 1005. 
281 634 F.2d at 425. 
282 103 S. Ct. at 2808 (White, J., dissenting). 
283 See Backiel, supra note 20, at 19. 
284 See supra note 205. 
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Congress' use of the FLPMA legislative veto provisions is con-
sonant with the purposes of the separation of powers doctrine. 
The exercise of the FLPMA legislative vetoes does not impermis-
sibly interfere with the executive or the judicial branches' central 
functions. Rather, their exercise is an exercise of Congress' con-
stitutional power under the property clause. Moreover, the legis-
lative veto provisions promote the practical administration of 
government since they allow Congress to make policy decisions in 
this area without becoming entangled in the details of day-to-day 
land use administration. The separation of powers doctrine does 
not draw strict borderlines between the three branches. It is a 
practical, flexible doctrine which allows for deviations when 
unique circumstances require it.285 Congress does not violate the 
separation of powers doctrine when it uses the legislative veto 
provisions in FLPMA to protect the nation's natural resources 
from exploitation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act is the most 
comprehensive federal land statute ever enacted. The seven legis-
lative vetoes that Congress included in the Act are central in 
carrying out the goals of the Act: they help to ensure that the 
public lands wit! be retained in the hands of the federal govern-
ment, and they return to Congress the power to formulate land 
management policy. Under the article I analysis announced by 
the Supreme Court in Chadha, however, these legislative veto 
provisions would be held unconstitutional. The Supreme Court's 
reasoning in Chadha has both practical and constitutional flaws. 
The Court's analysis in Chadha is too sweeping and indiscrimi-
nate to be useful; it would strike down almost any congressional 
action taken without presentment to the President. 
The separation of powers analysis suggested by Justices Powell 
and White is a more finely tuned, pragmatic standard by which to 
evaluate the constitutionality of legislative veto provisions. 
Under the separation of powers analysis, it would be possible to 
differentiate between constitutionally useful and unconstitution-
ally intrusive legislative vetoes. 
The FLPMA legislative veto provisions demand a more prag-
matic, constitutional evaluation under the separation of powers 
:l85 See 103 S. Ct. at 2808 (White, J., dissenting). See also 634 F.2d at 423-24. 
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doctrine. The veto provisions do not violate the separation of 
powers doctrine. Their use does not intrude on the functions of 
the other branches of government. Moreover, they permit Con-
gress to efficiently and effectively utilize its property clause 
power to ensure that the nation's public lands are not unwisely or 
irretrievably damaged. The FLPMA legislative vetoes are valu-
able tools which Congress must be able to use to protect our 
national resources. 
